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 Abstract 
This thesis studies mergers & acquisitions and its integration process. The main 
focus has been to examine the variables that affect the level of integration. An 
initial literature review was conducted where the authors found a slight discrep-
ancy within the M&A literature about which factors should determine the level of 
integration. The authors found this interesting and decided to investigate it fur-
ther, wherefore a case study was conducted. The empirical findings were ana-
lyzed using the theoretical frame of reference and the authors found the varia-
bles in the theories to be applicable. However, there might be a common ground 
where the theories intersect wherefore a framework was developed, taking all 
variables affecting the level of integration into consideration simultaneously.  
The findings, both theoretical and empirical, suggest that the variables that do 
affect the level of integration are the motives behind the acquisition, the organi-
zational relatedness and the need for strategic interdependence or organization-
al autonomy. 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter will present a general background on mergers & acquisitions with 
emphasis on the importance of this topic. Thereafter, the chapter will present the 
area of research and problem identification, followed by an exposition of the 
purpose, the research question, the delimitations and the disposition of the the-
sis. 
1.1 Background  
To merge and acquire companies is a popular way of adding value to an organi-
zation. It is the most common way to achieve rapid growth (Som, 2009). But also 
a common way to enter foreign markets (Som, 2009; Roberts and Barry, 1984), 
get access to intellectual property rights, or to acquire particular expertise and 
knowledge (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993; Gaughan, 2001). According to Shau et 
al (2012), the global mergers & acquisitions, henceforth called M&As, totaled 
2,178.4 billion US dollars and there were 12,455 deals announced in 2011.  
 
Two types of acquisitions exist, friendly or hostile (DePamphilis 2012). Friendly 
acquisitions occur whenever the board of the target company approves the ac-
quisition and recommends its shareholders to accept the bid. Contrary to that, 
hostile acquisitions occur when the initial approach from the acquiring firm is 
unwanted by the target company, which does not want to be acquired or merged. 
A friendly acquisition is therefore preferred, since they often consummate at a 
lower price, and the post-merger integration is much easier to conduct since 
both parties cooperate (Ibid).  
 
The assertion about friendly or non-friendly M&As is supported by Pritchett et al 
(1997), although they divided the two groups into four sub groups that spans 
from cooperative to adversarial (figure 1). This framework is supposed to help 
management to cope with problems that might occur during the M&A processes.  
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Cooperative       Adversarial 
 
Figure 1 Acquisition Strategies (Pritchett et al, 1997, p. 17) 
The first category of a friendly acquisition is a rescue operation, which is initiat-
ed by a company that is in a direct need of a savior. The acquirer either performs 
a financial salvage operation or acts as a white knight. The second category of a 
friendly acquisition is the collaborative acquisition, characterized by the mutual 
efforts of both companies to merge. The contested situation is quite similar to 
the collaborative acquisition, but there is one major difference, since here it is 
only one company that has a strong will to close the deal. The raid is a direct hos-
tile takeover where personal motives from executives are an important factor for 
the acquisition.  
 
According to Schweizer (2005) there are as many motives behind M&As as there 
are number of M&As, since all companies have different needs and capabilities. 
Every M&A agreement will be unique in some aspects, although there will be a 
remarkable number of features they all hold in common (Pritchett et al, 1997). 
Mergers are enough alike, that one can learn from one and apply it to the other, 
so that managers and executives can be told what to expect and how to contend 
with the M&A effectively (Ibid).  
 
The motives behind the M&A are necessary to take into consideration when 
studying the integration between the acquiring and acquired company, since 
they often determine the integration approach and the level of integration cho-
sen (Shrivastava, 1986; Haspeslagh and Jamison, 1991; Schweizer, 2005). 
 
Brouthers et al (1998) divides the motives into three main groups, namely eco-
nomic, personal and strategic motives (table 1).  
 
 
Rescue Collaboration 
Contested  
Situation 
Raid 
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Table 1 M&A motives, (Brouthers et al, 1998, p. 348) 
Economic motives Personal motives Strategic motives 
Economies of scale Increase sales/firm 
growth 
Pursuit of market power 
Increasing profitability Managerial challenge Acquisition of a competi-
tor 
Risk-spreading and cost 
reduction 
Acquisition of inefficient 
management 
Acquisition of raw mate-
rial 
Create shareholder value Enhance managerial 
pride 
Creation of barriers to 
entry 
According to DePamphilis (2003), most M&As are a result of a number of differ-
ent motives combined. Some of the more common motives are business synergy, 
financial synergy, diversification, market power, strategic realignment, hubris, 
acquiring undervalued assets, mismanagement, managerialism and tax consider-
ations (Ibid).  
 
Although the concept of M&As is very popular and often appreciated by inves-
tors, the outcome of an M&A does not always meet the expectations. Kelly et al 
(1999) states that of the benefits anticipated from M&As, only about 75 % of the 
benefits were attainable. Another study made by Jennings (1985), showed that 
over 70 % of the acquisitions studied failed to meet expectations. With this stat-
ed, it seems that to merge and acquire, i.e. to put together two autonomous busi-
nesses and make it into one, is not as easy as it might seem. Either the expecta-
tions from an M&A need to be lowered, or most of the companies of the world 
have to improve and gain more knowledge about M&As.   
 
One of the most important elements to make an M&A successful is the integra-
tion process (Bohlin et al, 2000; Datta & Grant, 1990), which is determined by 
the level of integration chosen. The level of integration spectrum ranges from a 
laissez-faire approach with minimal contact between the target and the acquirer, 
to a full integration approach where the two organizations truly merge into one 
(Hubbard, 2001). However, a closer integration between the companies will not 
necessarily make the M&A more successful (Bohlin et al, 2000; Datta & Grant, 
1990.). In some cases less integration between the companies is needed to make 
the M&A successful (Ibid). This is why the level of integration is such an im-
portant element to take into consideration and why it is important to study. 
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1.2 Problem identification 
The authors have found a discrepancy within the M&A literature about which 
factors should determine what level of integration to choose.  Hubbard’s (2001) 
view is that the level of integration is determined by the strategic motives behind 
the acquisition. Another view is presented by Howell (1970), Dundas and Rich-
ardson (1982) & Datta and Grant (1990). They claim that the level of integration 
should be determined on the basis of the relatedness between the two business-
es. A third view is presented by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) whom claim that 
the level of integration should be dependent on the need for strategic interde-
pendence and the synergies that is to be realized versus the need for organiza-
tional autonomy between the two firms. Do all these variables really affect the 
level of integration? 
1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of the thesis is to contribute to the M&A literature by studying an 
acquisition and analyze its level of integration, in order to examine what affects 
the level of integration.  
1.4 Research question 
What variables affect the level of integration? 
1.5 Delimitations 
This thesis will solely focus on the variables that affect the level of integration 
between the acquirer and the acquired company. There will be no discussions 
about key aspects for a successful M&A integration. The authors are aware that 
much of the M&A literature focuses on how to conduct the integration process, 
rather than deciding the level of integration. Wherefore, this thesis aims to act as 
a counterweight to the other M&A literature and focuses on the level of integra-
tion.  
 
The framework, developed by the authors, which will be presented in this thesis, 
is not indented to be used as a tool for managers, but rather as a guideline for 
understanding the theoretical aspects of what affects the level of integration. 
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1.6 Disposition 
Theoretical frame of reference – this section provides the theoretical basis for this 
thesis. The theories presented will describe and explain the different points of 
view on what should determine the level of integration. 
 
Methodology – this section describes how the research process for this thesis was 
conducted. The research approach, the research method and the case study is 
described along with a discussion of the validity and reliability of the research 
approach. 
 
Empirical findings – This section presents the empirical findings. The empirical 
data has been gathered from Company Alpha, during four in-depth interviews 
with the executives involved in the acquisitions. The first part describes Alphas 
acquisition of Beta and the second part describes Alphas acquisition of Gamma. 
These parts are thereafter divided into two sections, one describing the motives 
behind the acquisition and the other describing the integration processes.  
 
Analysis and discussion – This chapter analyzes the empirical findings and how it 
correlates with the theoretical frame of reference. Thereafter, the existing theo-
retical models will be discussed and a combined framework, developed by the 
authors, is presented. 
 
Conclusion and suggestions for further research – this section presents the au-
thor’s conclusion as well as recommendations for further studies.  
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2. Theoretical frame of reference 
An important part of the integration process is to determine the level of integra-
tion. The level of integration ranges from nearly non-existent to a full integration 
between the two companies. The authors have found three main views that de-
termine the level of integration, all of which will be presented below. 
2.1 Integration based on strategic motives 
The first view, held by Hubbard (2001), is that the strategic motives behind the 
acquisition will determine what level of integration to choose. When the level of 
integration is decided there is a delicate balance between achieving the acquir-
er’s goals in the quickest possible time and the potential disruption of the ac-
quired firm’s business, so that the expected benefits from the acquisitions cannot 
be realized. There is also a balance between cost and achieving a deeper level of 
integration. Hubbard (2001) also states that personal motives are common in 
M&As, but generally do not affect decisions regarding the level of integration. 
Hubbard (2001) has developed a framework that can be used to determine the 
likely level of integration during an M&A (figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Likely Possible Unlikely 
Figure 2 Strategic motive and degree of integration (Hubbard, 2001, p. 59) 
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In this framework, the strategic motives for M&As, found on the vertical axis, are 
grouped into six different categories: financial synergy, market entry, vertical 
expansion, asset potential, market penetration and economy of scale. The 
framework identifies the level of integration that is most probable in regards to 
the strategic motive behind the M&A. The degree of integration is categorized 
into four general levels, which are found on the horizontal axis. The four levels 
are financial control, change with controls, functional integration and total inte-
gration. There are often several strategic motives behind an M&A, and the 
framework is structured so that the combination of the strategic motives will 
display the most probable level of integration. The most probable level of inte-
gration is displayed via a frame around the combination of the motives behind 
the acquisition and the levels of integration, explained in figure 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Likely Possible Unlikely 
Figure 3 How a combination of the motives generates the most probable levels of integration. (Hub-
bard, 2001, p. 60) 
The strategic motives in Hubbard’s (2001) model are the following: 
 
Financial synergy is when the M&A takes place in order to achieve enhanced 
earnings via tax breaks, accounting modifications, better facilities or more attrac-
tive financing terms. 
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Market entry is an organizational acquisition with the intent to enter into new, 
related or unrelated markets, to enter an unrelated industry or to enter new ge-
ographic regions as in cross boarder M&As. 
 
Vertical expansion is when the M&A is made as an attempt to increase the con-
trol of distribution channels, the procurement of resources or to gain new tech-
nology through an acquisition of a related business. 
 
Asset potential is when the management of the organization believes they can 
use the assets of a target company in a better way than before. This can be done 
through more effective management, knowledge or technology transfer, change 
in control systems or by realization of several potential synergies between the 
organizations. 
 
Market penetration is when the M&A is carried out to increase the market pow-
er. This can be done through increased market shares, increased supplier power 
against the customers, via customer base similarities, market share protection or 
expansion on a geographical basis. Typically, the acquiring company buys a tar-
get that operates in a related business. 
 
The economy of scale motive is when the organization wants to consolidate op-
erating sites, administrative departments, and different functions or counter cy-
clical businesses to achieve cost savings. This can be done by realizations of syn-
ergies between parts of, or the whole organization.  
 
The different levels of integration in Hubbard’s (2001) model are the following: 
 
Financial control is when there is no physical integration, and the acquired com-
pany is supported and controlled only by financial means. The management of 
the acquired firm still has strategic decisions responsibilities and remains inde-
pendent to operate the business. 
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Change with control is when the acquiring company integrates some areas and 
makes small changes, e.g. replacement of existing management, introduction of 
new technology or implementation of more efficient working practices in the 
acquired company. The acquired company is left to operate the business with 
little interaction with other units. Financial controls are implemented to ensure 
that the acquired company complies with the strategies and objectives of the 
head office. 
 
Functional integration is when key functions or key departments are integrated, 
e.g. merging marketing or administrative departments, or centralization of key 
operating functions into a head office. Often, the objective is to achieve cost sav-
ings through economies of scale. 
 
Total integration is when the target and the acquirer truly merge into one, with 
integration of all similar functions and operations and also by merging the two 
organizations. The objective is to achieve significant economies of scale and to 
capitalize on both cost savings and operational synergies.  
2.2 Integration based on organizational relatedness 
Another view contends that to retain a successful integration process, related 
businesses should be closely integrated to realize synergistic benefits (Howell, 
1970; Dundas and Richardson 1982; Datta and Grant, 1990). Whereas not as re-
lated businesses, with less synergy, are better off if they are allowed to be auton-
omous, in order to prevent destruction of the qualities that made the acquired 
company attractive in the first place, and also to keep the commitment, creative-
ness and enthusiasm among the acquired managers alive (Ibid). In M&As be-
tween companies in unrelated businesses, it has been statistically proven that 
there is a strong correlation between the autonomy given and M&A success (Dat-
ta and Grant, 1990). However, in M&As with firms in related businesses, the re-
sults of the level of autonomy to be given are ambiguous due to the fact that a 
greater degree of autonomy will increase the motivation, morale and ability to 
take initiative among acquired firm managers (Ibid). At the same time, a lower 
level of autonomy will open up for a higher degree of interdependence, with pos-
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sible economic benefits through integration of resource management, operation 
and functional activities (Ibid). Therefore, decisions on the degree of autonomy 
given, in related business acquisitions, should be made after a careful examina-
tion of the potential synergies that are available (Ibid). Also, the costs of the real-
ization of such synergies and the potential loss of motivation within the acquired 
firm when the autonomy is suppressed should be taken into consideration (Ibid). 
 
To determine the level of integration, Howell (1970) argues that one has to look 
at the level of integration as a continuum of strategies based on a market and 
product mix. The continuum can be divided into three broad groups, with two 
extremes at each side and one group in the middle.  
 
The first end extreme on one end, involves a company’s acquisition of another 
unrelated company and implementation of a strategy where their businesses are 
intended to operate autonomously, but underneath the financial resources of the 
corporation. Therefore, the link between the acquisitions is solely financial. The 
acquiring company seeks to combine businesses that neither has the same mar-
ket served or any relations between the products manufactured.  
 
The second end extreme consists of an acquisition of a closely related business, 
with similar operations. The intention is to merge them into one company, with a 
combined manufacturing process. The products manufactured are related, but 
the market served might, or might not be related.  
 
The middle group comprises acquisitions that are linked through marketing. 
Normally the market or product areas, in which the acquisitions are made, are 
defined in order to organize the businesses by the markets served, rather than 
the products manufactured.  
 
To achieve a full integration, there is a need for a common core of unity between 
the two companies. According to Paine and Power (1983), financial ties alone are 
not sufficient. The acquiring company has to be able to contribute with certain 
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skills to the acquired company, and they have to show respect to the acquired 
company's products, markets and customers (Ibid).  
 
Another factor to consider in creating a successful M&A is the strategic and or-
ganizational fit between the companies (Nupponen, 1995). Angwin (2007) states 
that identification of potential synergies is important both for the financial re-
sults i.e. value creation, and the outcome of the integration between the two 
companies.  
 
Strategic fit is how the target firm complements or adds value to the strategy of 
the acquirer and therefore contributes to both the financial and non-financial 
goals of the combined business (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). The optimal output is 
not found in acquisitions between companies with identical product ranges, pro-
duction technologies or marketing channels, but from the strategic complement 
and differences in resource allocation (Nupponen, 1995).  
 
Organizational fit is the match between culture, organizational practices and 
personnel characteristics between the companies, which will affect the day-to-
day operations (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). The organizational fit will determine 
the ease of integrating two companies (Ibid). High organizational fit between the 
companies will often increase the post-acquisition performance (Nupponen, 
1995). A low organizational fit may indicate that the post-acquisition integration 
can provide organizational uncertainty, conflicts and misunderstandings during 
the integration process (Ibid). However, a low organizational fit does not neces-
sarily mean that the acquisition will have poor performance (Ibid). Datta (1991) 
emphasizes particularly on the similarities of management styles and manage-
ment reward systems. Differences in management styles will most likely de-
crease the post-acquisition performance.   
2.3 Integration based on strategic interdependence and the need for organi-
zational autonomy 
The last view highlights a framework, developed by Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991) that outputs the level of integration based on the firms different needs 
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concerning organizational autonomy and strategic interdependence. A high need 
for organizational autonomy means that the attractiveness of the acquired com-
pany lies in the way the company operates, their special corporate culture and 
their unique organization, wherefore a close integration would destroy the com-
pany boundary and possibly also the uniqueness of the company. A high need for 
strategic interdependence is when the expected synergies only can be achieved 
through close cooperation and deep integration between the two companies. 
Depending on the combination of these needs, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), 
suggest four different integration approaches: preservation, symbiosis, absorp-
tion and holding. Below, figure 4 illustrates which integration approach is pre-
ferred, depending on the need for organizational autonomy and strategic inter-
dependence, followed by an explanation of the four approaches.  
 Strategic interdependence 
High Low 
Need for organizational 
autonomy 
High Symbiosis  Preservation 
Low Absorption Holding 
Figure 4 Four types of integration approaches based on the need for strategic interdependence and 
organizational autonomy (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991, p. 145) 
Absorption acquisitions, according to Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991), occur when 
two firms absorb each other and truly merge into one. This approach is imple-
mented when there is a high need for interdependence to create the expected 
value from the M&A, and at the same time a low need for organizational autono-
my between the two companies. The integration process should be a full consoli-
dation of culture, organization and operation. The objective in absorption acqui-
sitions is to decompose all the boundaries between the two organizations, which 
could potentially take a very long time. The acquiring firm needs courage and 
determination to fulfill its vision of how the acquisition should be integrated. The 
issue in absorption acquisitions is not a question of how much integration that 
should take place, but rather a timing issue. It is important that everybody is 
onboard and that people do not start counteracting the integration process. Un-
expected problems due to cultural differences are common, especially when in-
terdependence is forced upon people. Therefore, it is often difficult to estimate 
exact cost and time of the integration process. 
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The symbiotic approach, according to Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991), is preferred 
when there is both a high need for strategic interdependence and organizational 
autonomy. A substantial transfer of competencies and capabilities has to take 
place, but at the same time the capabilities of the acquired firm needs to be pre-
served. This approach is commonly used when there are synergies to be made, 
but other things such as brand, culture and corporate identity are initially to be 
preserved to avoid confusion. Symbiotic acquisitions start like a preservation 
acquisition, where the two firms coexist. Then the firms gradually integrate 
deeper, becoming increasingly interdependent. Symbiotic acquisitions need both 
boundary preservation and boundary permeability simultaneously. This ap-
proach presents the biggest managerial challenge, due to its complex nature. 
 
The preservation approach is, according to Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991), desired 
when the acquired firm has a high need for organizational autonomy and the two 
firms have a low need for strategic interdependence. Since the acquired firm is 
given a high level of autonomy, the acquired corporation preserves much of its 
independence, which reduces the risk of deterioration of the qualities and bene-
fits of the acquired firm. The preservation approach is preferred in situations 
where few operational synergies can be achieved and the context of their busi-
nesses requires a high degree of autonomy in the decision-making process. Full 
autonomy is often difficult to provide and even in preservation acquisitions, are-
as such as financial risk sharing are often made interdependent and general 
knowledge transfer among managers is often made. The preservation approach 
is common in cross-border M&As, due to the need of local market adaptation, 
which the acquired company, in most cases, has more knowledge of. The objec-
tive in the preservation approach is to preserve the acquired organization’s iden-
tity as far as possible. Since value from synergies is not to be sought, value 
should instead be created through funding of the acquired company, the en-
largement of markets, positive changes in ambition, risk-taking and professional-
ism of the acquired firm managers. 
 
The holding approach is more rarely used, but takes place when there is a low 
need for strategic interdependence and at the same time a low need for organiza-
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tional autonomy. This would, according to Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991), be ac-
quisitions where the acquiring firm has no intention of integrating or creating 
value thought anything except financial risk sharing and transfer of general 
management capabilities, even though the two firms operate in such similar 
businesses that there is no need for independence between them. Even though 
holding acquisitions are rare, companies do sometimes use a holding approach, 
since it is easy due to the low integration needed. But, the two firms might bene-
fit from more integration since there is no real need for organizational autono-
my. 
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3. Methodology 
This chapter will provide a general description of the research process for this 
thesis. The chosen methodological approach will be defined and explained. The 
methodology for this specific study is a qualitative case study where primary 
data was collected via semi-structured interviews and secondary data from offi-
cial documents. The research method was inspired by deductive principles.   
3.1 Research approach, process and case selection 
The authors of this thesis whishes to get a deeper understanding of how the level 
of integration is decided after an M&A, they therefore decided to formulate an 
initial, broad, research question in order to understand the main concepts and 
variables involved in the M&A process. A critical literature review was thereafter 
conducted, to get a solid background within the field of M&A. The theories pre-
sented in the theoretical frame of reference consist of the most cited theories 
concerning the level of integration that the authors could find.  During the litera-
ture review, the authors found a slight discrepancy between the theories about 
what affects the level of integration. The authors found this interesting and de-
cided to investigate this further via a case study. 
 
The case study was designed according to Yin’s (2009) principles of a deductive 
method, who states that the procedure is similar to an experiment, where an ini-
tial hypothesis is formulated and tested against the empirical findings in order to 
be verified or falsified. The hypothesis was that the theories within the theoreti-
cal frame of reference match reality. According to Yin (2009), it is possible to 
generalize from the empirical findings, in order to validate the existing theories. 
 
The process for finding a suitable case began with identification of an interesting 
industry, where there has been M&As during the last years. A specific company 
was identified and chosen since it was one that could provide a single case, with 
two subcases. The authors thought that a single case with subcases might be a 
suitable choice since it provides the possibility to study the processes and simul-
taneously provide the possibility to compare the subcases. Also, the choice of 
case company was made by accessibility, since the company chosen gave the au-
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thors access to key personnel, which had been involved in the M&A process. The 
case can be seen as representative or typical, since the studied company has 
gone through M&As and its integration processes. It provides the knowledge that 
is needed in order to understand the process that occurs during an M&A. 
 
When the data was analyzed, it became obvious that the existing theories could 
not be used one by one to explain why a certain level of integration had been 
used by the company in the case study. The authors found that all theories af-
fected the level of integration, but to get a broader picture of the complex matter 
of M&A integration, a combination of the theories could be used.  A new frame-
work for deciding the level of integration was developed but not tested, which is 
suggested for further research. 
3.2 Data collection 
Empirical material was collected during four in-depth interviews. The interviews 
were conducted with open-ended questions, since the authors did not want to 
restrain interviewees’ answers. The questions were formulated with the intent 
to get the interviewees’ answers to relate to the studied subject. The interview-
ees are all executives who were involved in the processes before, during and af-
ter the M&As. The three interviewees will be referred to as Adam who is Alpha’s 
Corporate Communication manager,  Bernard who is president at one of Alpha’s 
business units, Tax and Charles who was the CFO at Gamma before becoming 
vice president at one of Alpha’s business units and David who is CFO at Alpha. 
The company where the case study was conducted has chosen to be anonymous, 
due to the sensitive data they provided the authors with. The anonymity gave 
them the chance to speak more freely and not being afraid of company strategies 
or secrets to be revealed to their competitors. Therefore are all the names, dates 
and numbers in the empirical findings and in the analysis and discussion ficti-
tious. There is no possibility for other researchers to get access to the exact same 
persons at the exact same company, since it cannot be deduced from this thesis 
at which company the research was conducted.  
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3.3 Validity and Reliability 
Validity and reliability is key aspects of a research project. In order to maintain a 
high degree of research quality throughout the whole process, the authors con-
stantly kept these factors in mind during the whole research process in order to 
be able to present a scientific, valid and reliable thesis, within the given time 
frame. There have been many and long discussions, concerning the framework 
developed by the authors, about how it shall be presented, explained and used. 
The link between this thesis and earlier research is important, since this thesis 
only uses a single case, which is impossible to quantify. 
 
All interviews were recorded and later on compiled. The recordings were re-
listened many times, so that no important information was left out in order to 
increase the internal validity as described by Merriam (1998). The external va-
lidity will not be further discussed, since this thesis’ findings is based the specific, 
wherefore they are not to be generalized. To further increase the internal validi-
ty, the interviewees had different perspectives of the M&As which gave the au-
thors, according to Merriam (1998), the possibility to triangulate the findings. 
During the whole empirical process, the authors had a constant dialogue with the 
interviewees. They got the interview questions in advance, so they could prepare 
answers. After the interviews the authors compiled the findings and e-mailed it 
to the interviewee for acceptance, to avoid misinterpretation and misunder-
standings. The finished empirical text was also sent to the interviewees for fur-
ther validation. Also, there has been a constant dialogue and discussion with the 
tutor, who brought many interesting new thoughts and came with guidance.  
 
Some critique against the method of this study is that replication can be hard to 
obtain due to the nature of the research approach and the anonymity of the re-
spondents.  However, Merriam (1998) argues that reliability in qualitative is not 
found by replication, but whether the results are consistent with the collected 
data. 
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4. Empirical findings 
This chapter will present the empirical findings gathered by the authors during 
four face-to-face interviews with executives at the company, Alpha. Initially, a 
case description is presented, followed by two parts, one for each M&A, describ-
ing its motives and integration processes. Since the studied company wishes to 
be anonymous, all names, dates and numbers are fictitious.  
4.1 Case description – Company Alpha 
The studied company, Alpha, is a large publicly traded Scandinavian accounting 
firm. In the year 2005 they acquired two different companies, Beta and Gamma. 
Beta was a former business partner to Alpha, operating in another European 
country with different customers. Gamma was a local competitor, having the 
same customers as Alpha. All three companies were equal in size, with approxi-
mately 10 000 employees and a total turnover of approximately €850 million. 
 
Alpha’s vision is to become a global partner within its field of business, since it 
will create possibilities to canalize the company’s financial and strategic re-
sources in the most optimal direction. To achieve this vision, Alpha had an ex-
pansion approach towards new markets. There was also a criterion that all ac-
quisitions had to add value to the company. There was a consensus within the 
board of directors that Alpha had a non-organic growth strategy for its globaliza-
tion, and they started the search for possible acquisition targets. During the time 
of the pre-acquisition planning, there were several changes of key personnel 
within the company and also a major change within the ownership structure, as 
the Kappa-Group became the main shareholder, thus affecting the strategy.  
4.2 Alphas acquisition of Beta 
This section will describe Alpha’s acquisition and integration of Beta, a former 
business partner in another European country. 
4.2.1 Motives behind the acquisition 
A new strategy for Alpha’s business unit, Tax, was set in 2003. At that time, they 
had a large exposure towards a few local customers who contributed to about 
85% of the department’s annual turnover. The new strategy was to become less 
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independent on those few large customers. In order to achieve this they had to 
expand outside the local market, preferably by entering a new country. The deci-
sion was between a Greenfield entry or buying a local actor. A joint venture pro-
ject was never relevant.  
 
Alpha had former experience of entering new markets via Greenfield entry, and 
therefore knew that this strategy would not be cost effective and be too time 
consuming. Alpha had a history of acquisitions. Since its foundation in the 1970s 
they had acquired numerous companies comprised of 1-200 employees with 
relatively good results. In 2003, the tax department began to collaborate with a 
foreign company, Beta, since one of their major customers asked if they could 
provide a shared tender offer for a larger project.  
 
The following year, the management of Alpha, Beta and Beta’s owners held a 
meeting where they discussed if and how they could develop their collaborations 
on their shared market. At that meeting, Beta’s owners asked Alpha’s manage-
ment if they would be interested in buying Beta. The owners of Beta wanted to 
build a large conglomerate, but had failed to achieve profitability and were, 
therefore, interested in selling Beta. Despite this friendly approach, there were 
many prospective buyers of Beta and Alpha had to participate in a bidding war 
that they finally won.  
 
By this time, Alpha had a new ownership structure and a new major shareholder, 
The Kappa-Group, who had to accept the proposition. Their plan for Alpha was to 
change the agenda of the company. The strategy was about to change from being 
a market follower to becoming a market leader. The owners of Beta did not have 
a clear strategic intention with Betas business, and therefore Beta felt a bit mis-
treated. Alpha decided to acquire Beta in order to follow their vision to become a 
global actor within its field of business. Another contributing factor was that Al-
pha was able to negotiate a favorable loan, and therefor had the financial 
strength for this acquisition.  
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By acquiring Beta, Alpha got access to a new market in another country along 
with new customers and a broadening of their business, due to the differences 
between the companies. Beta had the knowledge of managing larger and more 
complex projects, wherefore knowledge transfer between the organizations was 
possible. As a larger company they could now reach larger customers with a new 
offer, and the market became more aware of their existence. Adam, Bernard and 
David stated that the motives behind the acquisition were solely strategic and 
economical, but Bernard, who is president of the merged divisions, described 
that there is a person behind every acquisition.  
4.2.2 Integration process 
Acquisition processes do take time. It ranges from the first intention to the full 
closure, and since Alpha had been involved at a high level from the beginning of 
the Beta selling process, they had time to set up both a pre-merger and a post-
merger plan, concerning both financial issues and the integration process. They 
had set both short- and long-term goals for Beta, in order to energize the organi-
zation and stimulate the integration processes.  
 
The post-merger goals aimed to achieve profitability and to stabilize the busi-
ness. In order to achieve this in the shortest possible amount of time, they decid-
ed to appoint a new board of directors at Beta directly after the acquisition. This 
was carried out at the same time as Beta’s finances were integrated into Alpha’s 
budget, which was considered to be the final step of the acquisition. However, 
the integration process started before the acquisition was completed, in order to 
kick-start the process. They had set a time limit of 100 days for the integration, 
with the motivation that this is the amount of time one has the largest chance to 
affect the organization and usurp the short-term synergies.   
 
Since Beta’s business was located in another country, Alpha chose not to use its 
Scandinavian office for the integration processes. Instead, they used an external 
consultancy firm that held the responsibility. Bernard, from the Tax department 
which had the most synergies to Beta, was involved in the process as a supervi-
sor. Since many organizational parts differed between Alpha and Beta, and due 
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to the fact that they were located in different countries, they decided not to inte-
grate several elements, which include the accounting systems and law depart-
ments, and instead focus on the cooperation between their business depart-
ments. The focus of the integration was not to merge Alpha and Beta; instead 
they decided to make Beta autonomous, but with extensive collaboration with, 
and under the same financial umbrella as the Tax department. The integration 
processes were therefore focusing on introduction and information of key per-
sonnel from both companies, in order to obtain organizational understandings 
between the two companies, and informing customers of the new organization 
and its capabilities. Nevertheless they consider their strategies to be dependent. 
Their goal is to broaden their markets, to become a more competitive actor in the 
local market and to create technical synergies. Since the intention was to achieve 
a lower level of integration, the cost for the integration was low. When re-
organizations were necessary, the redundant personnel had to leave the compa-
ny.  
 
The cooperation and collaboration between Beta and the Tax department is con-
sidered to be extensive, as intended. Beta had a high degree of organizational 
autonomy through its own financial and organizational plans. Despite the finan-
cial differences, Beta had the same rules for investment as the rest of the compa-
ny. They did not have enough autonomy to do their own financial investments, 
even though they had their own financial and profitability goals.  
 
Adam, Bernard and David all consider the acquisition and integration of Beta 
successful. They all state that Alpha would not have the market position they 
have today if the acquisition had not been realized, and both the economical and 
strategic goals have been fulfilled. Adam even states that the acquisition was 
necessary for the survival of both Alpha and Beta. Despite this, Alpha had to 
make a goodwill impairment of Beta’s book value, for a total of one third of the 
acquisition price as a result of the bidding war where Alpha paid too much for 
Beta.  
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Today, the integration between Alpha and Beta is considered done and they have 
reached the sought level of integration. The process took a bit longer than ex-
pected, due to a financial and following branch crisis. There was not an exact 
time that the process was closed; it was rather a natural step. Today there are no 
active integration processes, but there is an ongoing process of continuous im-
provement, mostly with respect to the effectiveness within the organization.  
4.3 Alphas acquisition of Gamma 
This section will describe Alpha’s acquisition and integration of Gamma, a local 
competitor. 
4.3.1 Motives behind the acquisition 
Alpha’s main strategy was to achieve growth. They were interested in organic 
expansion and acquiring rapid growth, as well as to expand and strengthen their 
market. Alpha’s board of directors had set a vision for the company that stated 
its focus on becoming a global actor, with a strong and well-established local 
market. They also emphasized particularly on being an attractive employer for 
potential new talents. In the same area where Alpha had their main market and 
largest customer, they also had a local competitor, namely Gamma. In general, 
Alpha and Gamma had the same customers and market share.  
 
Gamma had a history of being acquired. At this time, they were owned by a com-
pany that was only partly related to their core business and were not pleased 
with their situation. The owner of Gamma, Delta, put Gamma up for sale but 
failed to gain the interest of other companies to acquire Gamma. During the time 
that Alpha got a new main shareholder, Delta was sold to Theta, and Gamma ex-
pressed the will to be sold since theirs product did not correlate to those of The-
ta. The main owner of Alpha, the Kappa-group, identified Gamma as a potential 
part of Alpha and the possibility to merge the two companies. The Kappa group 
had identified many operating and financial synergies and therefore decided to 
acquire Gamma. At this time, Alpha was in the middle of the integration process 
with Beta, where they currently had their full focus.  However, when the Kappa-
Group acquired Gamma, Alpha, who had previously identified Gamma as a poten-
tial partner, knew that a merger between them could soon be reality. Soon after, 
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The Kappa-Group sold Gamma to Alpha for the same price as they had acquired 
it for from Theta. Alpha’s acquisition of Gamma was leveraged, which resulted in 
a high loan to value ratio. Alpha was able to take a second big loan, with a prom-
ise to sell their unrelated subsidiaries later on and, therefore, they did not have 
to issue new stocks.  
 
The vision for the acquisition was to merge Alpha and Gamma, as well as Beta, 
into one company with one mutual strategy. In addition, there was a desire to 
share one vision, one set of values and have the same business goals. The eco-
nomical motive was to increase the cash flow via increased sales, realized syner-
gies, shared brand management, pressed supplier prices and raised customer 
prices. In addition, there were possibilities to streamline the organizations by 
cutting overhead costs such as offices, personnel et cetera. Although Alpha ac-
quired Gamma, they wanted the acquisition to be seen as a merger of equals. 
 
There was a broad understanding within both organizations for the fundamen-
tals behind the acquisition. Gamma was excited over the possibility to finally be 
able to operate under a clear strategic plan, and Alpha was positive to the possi-
bility to follow their strategy of creating a more competitive business and act 
more as a market leader rather than a market follower.  
4.3.2 Integration process 
At the time for Alphas acquisition of Gamma, they were already involved in the 
integration process with Beta. The process of integrating Beta was slowed down 
and the focus shifted towards integrating Gamma. Since the businesses, of Alpha 
and Gamma, were related, they decided to perform a full integration and merge 
into one unity. There were no plans of merging Beta and Gamma since their 
businesses were too different. Instead Alpha wanted to ensure a close coopera-
tion between the Tax departments of Alpha, Beta and Gamma, with extensive 
knowledge transfer between the three companies.  
 
They decided to use the same 100 day time span as is in the integration process 
with Beta. They also put up an integration office and assigned an integration of-
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ficer, Charles. As a result of the desired level of integration, they decided to use a 
best practice approach, where the best of both companies would be used in the 
new constellation. Alpha thought it would be important to not force their pro-
cesses onto Gamma, since they knew that Gamma had had previous negative ex-
perience of forced integration processes. Internally, they were very keen to use 
the term merger of equals.  All interviewees stated that they had learned much 
from the integration process with Beta, and used this experience in the new inte-
gration process. 
 
As a result of the best practice approach during the realization of the cost syner-
gies, they had to let personnel off. The merge between the two organizations and 
the realization of cost synergies sometimes demanded replacement of two em-
ployees with one. Also, if there were two different offices doing similar activities, 
they had to cut down to one. Alpha was very keen on keeping the employees in-
formed of the integration progress in order to avoid misunderstandings and mis-
interpretations.  
 
Even though Alpha was keen to avoid misunderstanding and misinterpretations, 
they did not focus on the integration of the organizational cultures. The integra-
tion general from Gamma, Charles, claims that the board of directors did not no-
tice any major differences between Alpha’s and Gamma’s organizations and cul-
tures, and therefore, decided to focus on the financial integration and thereafter 
take care of the organizational integration. However, Charles claims that there 
were some cultural differences and that, before the acquisition, employees rarely 
started working at Gamma after leaving their jobs at Alpha, and vice versa. 
Charles identified Gamma’s corporate culture as strong and Alpha’s weakened 
due to current owner situation, which caused some initial tensions between the 
merged organizations. As an example, Charles explains that the coffee cups were 
not changed into a standard model and that the employees kept their old cups 
with their previous company logos on, which created a slight lack of affinity 
around the coffee table. Another consequence of stalling the organizational inte-
gration was the branding issue, i.e. what to call the company. Charles suggested 
that they should drop the name Gamma and simply call the organization Alpha, 
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but Alpha’s managers decided to not offend any of the organizations, and focused 
more on merging the companies, rather than putting time and effort on branding, 
and simply called the company Alpha Beta Gamma Corporation. After a year they 
changed the name to Alpha, signifying that the companies were fully merged. 
Charles also states that, as a consequence of the merger, a couple of former man-
agers, from both Alpha and Gamma, left the companies and founded their own 
accounting firms, which are still up and running today. 
 
During the 100 day long integration process, they fully reach the objective of in-
tegrating the financial aspects and realizing their cost synergies. The organiza-
tional integration did take a slightly longer time, but they decided to put those 
processes down from the board level to the business unit level. New managers 
for the business units were appointed and became in charge of larger units with 
new personnel. They now identify the two companies to be fully integrated and 
no integration processes are current today. The units that were not merged are 
now either autonomous or sold.  
 
As a result of the acquisition of Gamma, Alpha identifies that they now have a 
much broader business, a more solid ground as a base for their existence where 
their bargaining power, as a much larger supplier, increased. They now have a 
larger local market and a wider knowledge base. In combination with the acqui-
sition of Beta, they have expanded their market and market share, broaden their 
competences and strengthen their market position. All interviewees state that 
the acquisitions and integration processes were successful and necessary for 
Alpha’s survival. They have fully reached their goals. 
 
Alpha is today seen as a market leader within their branch; therefore, it can be 
seen that they have accomplished their vision of turning into a market leader 
from a market follower. Today they have a broad business base in many different 
countries and a large market share in their local market. The three former com-
panies are nowadays seen as one. 
 26 
5. Analysis and discussion 
This chapter will analyze the empirical findings and how it correlates with the 
theoretical frame of reference. Thereafter, the existing theoretical models will be 
discussed and a combined framework, developed by the authors, is presented. 
5.1 Integration based on strategic motives 
One of the main reasons behind Alphas acquisition of Beta was the Tax depart-
ment’s new strategy, where they set that the department should not be depend-
ing on a few large customers. They needed to be more global in order to obtain 
new customers. The identification of Beta as a potential acquisition was made 
and they started the acquisition process. The strategic shift of the whole Alpha 
Company, where the new ownership structure did contribute to the will to ac-
quire Beta, since the new owners wanted to expand the markets served via en-
tering new markets. Therefore was the decisively aspects of the decision to ac-
quire Beta rather economical than strategical. There is clear evidence that the 
motives were also to use the acquired company's resources better then the for-
mer owners did. There was no intent to penetrate the market via incensement in 
market power, due to the different markets served by Alpha and Beta. This gives 
us the possibility to identify the motives behind the acquisition, and plot that 
into Hubbard’s (2001) model (figure 5). The model suggests that the level of in-
tegration shall be either financial controls or change with controls. The empirical 
findings give by hand that the actual level of integration was a change with con-
trol rather than just financial controls. For example, there were changes in exist-
ing management of Beta; introduction of new working practices and an imple-
mentation of a shared vision and strategy was made. Also, Alpha obtains finan-
cial control over Beta, which also points towards a change with control integra-
tion level.  
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Likely Possible Unlikely 
Figure 5 Alphas and Betas integration level based on Hubbard’s (2001) model (the authors) 
One of the motives behind the acquisition of Gamma was to strengthen the mar-
ket power. In fact, all the motives of the market penetration category can be 
identified except expansion on a geographical basis. Alpha wanted to increase 
the market share, probably more than protecting the current market share. This 
was later on achieved with ease, since Alpha and Gamma had such a similar mar-
ket offer with similar customers, and through the acquisition Alpha immediately 
got a larger market share. They also wanted to strengthen their bargaining pow-
er against their customers, which they also managed to achieve and they were 
able to charge their customers more for the same amount of service provided. 
Alpha were aware that there probably would be operating synergies between 
the companies, for example, realization of substantial cost synergies via merging 
offices where both companies had offices in the same city or region and merging 
their administrative departments. They knew that there would also be income 
synergies, since they would be able to take on larger projects, even though they 
did not focus on realizing those in the integration process and instead let them 
happen naturally, since they found the outcome of those synergies hard to meas-
ure. Altogether, this indicates that they also had an economy of scale motive. 
Since the motives behind this acquisition are market penetration and economies 
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of scale, we can plot this into Hubbard’s (2001) model (figure 6) and find out 
that the suggested level of integration is either a functional or total integration 
level. The empirical findings show that the actual level of integration was a total 
integration, rather than a functional integration. Since all similar functions and 
operations was merged, and not just the key functions, there is clear evidence of 
a full integration. Although the two organizations were merged, they intentional-
ly did not merge the two cultures in the beginning, which indicates that a total 
integration was not achieved initially. However, over time the cultural differ-
ences evaporated and the two organizations turned into one, completing a full 
integration. 
 
 
Likely Possible Unlikely 
Figure 6 Alphas and Gammas integration level based on Hubbard’s (2001) model (the authors) 
5.2 Integration based on organizational relatedness 
Alphas intention when acquiring Beta was to prevail the differences between the 
two companies. They had different markets served, and an already established 
organization at those markets. Due to this, they did not have the chance to merge 
the two organizations; there were no coexistence between them, which also 
were the reason for the acquisition. Also, the strategic fit between the companies 
can be seen as high since they complement each other’s strategies. Altogether, 
this indicates that Alpha and Beta has a high organizational relatedness giving by 
hand that the two companies should have a high level of integration. However, 
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the high strategic fit does not necessarily indicate that a high level of integration 
is needed. If the two companies were to merge their organizations, the strategic 
fit would be destroyed and the whole acquisition would be unnecessary.  
 
The organizational relatedness between Alpha and Gamma was high, since they 
operated within the same business area, had many mutual customers and they 
offered almost the same product the same market. At one side the organizational 
fit was high since the organizational practices and personnel characteristics was 
similar, but on the other hand the organizational cultures had slight differences. 
The organizational relatedness and the organizational fit between Alpha and 
Gamma are high, wherefore a high level of integration is preferable. The empiri-
cal findings supports that the actual level of integration between Alpha and 
Gamma was high. 
5.3 Integration based on strategic interdependence and the need for organi-
zational autonomy 
Since the main goal of the acquisition of Beta was to enter a new market in an-
other country, they did not need a high level of integration in order to reach the 
set goal and the synergies to be realized were not to be found in cost savings, the 
strategic interdependence between the companies was low. At the same time, 
the need for organizational autonomy was arguably high. If a larger part of Beta 
would have been integrated with Alpha and moved to the same location, a larger 
part of the benefit in the new market would also have been lost. Because the 
need for strategic interdependence was low and the need for organizational au-
tonomy was high the model created by Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) dictates 
that the integration approach would preferably be a preservation acquisition, 
demonstrated in figure 7. This corresponds well with what was found in the case 
study. The integration level was low, and instead value was created through 
funding of the acquired company, the enlargement of markets and positive 
changes company vision. 
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 Strategic interdependence 
High Low 
Need for organizational 
autonomy 
High Symbiosis  Preservation 
Low Absorption Holding 
Figure 7 Alphas and Betas integration level based on the need for strategic interdependence and 
organizational autonomy based on Haspeslagh & Jemison’s (1991) model (the authors) 
The need for strategic interdependence between Alpha and Gamma was high. To 
be able to take on bigger projects, the two companies had to merge into one. Al-
so, to be able to realize the expected cost synergies, they had to consolidate their 
offices, departments, merge their accounting systems and streamline the organi-
zation. The need for organizational autonomy was low since the differences in 
working practices and culture was not something that had to be preserved. In-
stead, it would perhaps have been beneficial if those differences were erased. 
Because the need for strategic interdependence was high and the need for organ-
izational autonomy was low the model created by Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991) dictates that the integration approach would be an absorption acquisi-
tion, demonstrated in figure 8. This also corresponds with what was found in the 
case study. The integration level was high and instead value was created through 
realization of cost synergies and a full merger of the two organizations. 
 Strategic interdependence 
High Low 
Need for organizational 
autonomy 
High Symbiosis  Preservation 
Low Absorption Holding 
Figure 8 Alphas and Gammas integration level based on the need for strategic interdependence and 
organizational autonomy based on Haspeslagh & Jemison’s (1991) model (the authors) 
5.4 Theoretical discussion and introduction of a new framework 
The authors consider all three views relevant to the level of integration decision 
and when applying them to the gathered empirical material they have all been 
proven to affect the level of integration, but in different ways. To pin point what 
exact level of integration to choose is difficult, but the different methods are all 
helpful in the decision process, one by one. The different methods all have their 
own advantages and disadvantages. 
 
Hubbard’s (2001) model provides a direct link between the acquisition motive 
and the level of integration. The advantage of using this model is that the acquisi-
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tion motive is relatively easy to identify, which makes the model applicable. The 
disadvantage is that when there are several motives behind the acquisition the 
likely degree of integration becomes vague, due to the design of the matrix. 
 
Integration based on organizational relatedness has the advantage of taking the 
organizational structures into consideration, which in theory makes the decision 
decision process quick and easy. But in reality, it might be hard to identify the 
relatedness between the organizations and their strategic and organizational fit. 
Furthermore, the levels of integration are seen as continuum rather than specific 
categories and therefore the model does not provide an exact solution. 
 
Haspeslagh and Jemision’s (1991) model is based on the needs for strategic in-
terdependence and organizational autonomy is rather complex, due to the high 
level of understanding of all comprised parts needed, and might be difficult to get 
acquainted with. Also, when finally familiarized with the model, the results to be 
retrieved from it become obvious. If, for example, a high need for organizational 
autonomy is identified, it is rather clear that a close integration is not optimal. 
However, the different elements within the model are important for the deter-
mination of the level of integration. 
 
Although there are three different views on how the level of integration should 
be determined, there might be a common ground where the theories intersect.  A 
framework has been developed by the authors of this thesis, combining the three 
views into one framework, in an attempt to display the intersection between 
them, and to provide an understanding of what variables affect the level of inte-
gration by taking all the variables into consideration simultaneously. The model 
is to be found in figure 9, followed by an explanation of the model. 
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Figure 9 Relations between acquisition motive, organizational relatedness, strategic dependence 
and level of integration, developed by the authors 
On the vertical axis, the motives behind the acquisition are listed. The motives 
derive from Hubbard´s (2001) theory, but the authors have chosen to take the 
first four categories and instead use two broader categories. The last two catego-
ries in Hubbard’s (2001) model are similar to the last two in this model. Howev-
er, the names of the categories are altered to names which the authors find more 
appropriate. The authors share the view that personal motives do not directly 
relate to the level of integration. Hence, they are excluded from the model. In 
reality, the motives, as well as the level of integration, can be seen as a continu-
um. However, we have chosen to follow Hubbard’s (2001) example, using cate-
gories to make the model more practical and easier to use. The four motive cate-
gories are: 
 
Market enhancement; where the motive is to improve the conditions of the mar-
ket, or to widen the market served. It includes both financial motives, such as 
enhanced earnings via tax breaks, accounting modifications, better facilities, 
more attractive financing terms and the market entry motive, where the compa-
ny acquires in order to enter into a new geographic, related or unrelated market. 
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Resource improvement; where the motive either is to improve existing resources 
or to use the resources of the acquired company in a better way. It includes in-
creased control of distribution channels, procurement of new resources, pur-
chase of new technology, potential knowledge transfer and improving the ac-
quired company assets via more effective management, change in control sys-
tems or potential synergies in resource allocation. 
 
Market penetration; where the motive can be to increase market power within 
the market where the company operates. This includes increasing market share, 
increasing supplier power against customers, protection of market share and 
expansion on a geographical basis within the current field of operation.  
 
Operating synergies; where the motive can be to consolidate operating sites, 
administrative departments, and different functions or counter cyclical busi-
nesses to achieve cost savings, enhanced earnings and increased efficiency. 
 
On the horizontal axis, the levels of integration are to be found, as well as the 
organizational relatedness and the strategic need between the companies. The 
levels also derive from Hubbard’s (2001) model, but the names are altered to 
names that the authors think better describes the differences between the levels 
of integration. There are also similarities between the four levels used in this 
model and the four integration approaches described in Haspeslagh and 
Jemison’s (1991) model. The four levels of integration are: 
 
Financial integration; where there is no physical integration and the acquired 
company is supported and controlled only by financial means. The management 
of the acquired firm still has responsibility for strategic decisions and they are 
left to operate the business autonomously. 
 
Managerial integration; where the existing management are either replaced or 
given new practices, to make minor changes in the acquired company, by intro-
ducing of new technology or implementing of more efficient working practices. 
The acquired company is then left to operate the business with little interaction 
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with other business units. However, financial controls are implemented to en-
sure that the acquired company complies with the strategies and objectives of 
the head office. 
 
Functional integration; where key functions or key departments are integrated, 
e.g. merging marketing or administrative departments or centralization of key 
operating functions into a head office.  
 
Full integration; where the target and the acquirer truly merge into one, with 
integration of all similar functions and operations and also by merging on an or-
ganizational level.  
 
The organizational relatedness arrow is based on the theories by Howell, 1970; 
Dundas and Richardson, 1982; Datta and Grant, 1990, where closely related 
businesses should be closely integrated and not as related businesses with less 
synergy are better off if they are allowed to be autonomous. The authors see a 
relationship between organizational relatedness and organizational fit, where 
related organizations should be more closely integrated and the organizational 
fit will determine the ease of implementing this close integration. 
 
The strategic need arrow is based on the theory by Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991) where companies with high strategic interdependence ought to make a 
deeper integration. Whereas, if there is a low strategic interdependence the 
companies, as proven by Datta (1991), are better off if they are allowed to act 
independently. If the strategic benefit of the acquired company is to be found in 
the uniqueness of the company, there is a need for organizational autonomy. If 
the acquired company gets to closely integrated, the company boundary will be 
destroyed and the strategic benefit from acquiring the company might be de-
stroyed. Hence, if there is a high need for organizational autonomy, there should 
be less integration between the companies. 
 
To use the model, the motives behind the acquisition should first be identified. If 
there is more than one motive, the motive which fits in the category closest to 
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the bottom of the list should be used, since the model is cumulative. To achieve 
functional integration, for example, one has to achieve both financial and mana-
gerial integration first, in order to achieve functional integration. Once the mo-
tive category is found, one can use the model to point out the level of integration 
that is more or less likely. Following, depending on the strategic need and organ-
izational relatedness, the level of integration desired will shift on the horizontal 
plane according to those needs. However, if there is, at the same time, both a high 
need for strategic interdependence and low organizational relatedness, one has 
to evaluate which of those needs are more important to be able to make a sound 
decision on the level of integration. 
 
As an example of how the model works: if the motive behind the acquisition is to 
penetrate the existing market, by getting a bigger market share, one can read 
from the model, found in figure 10, that functional integration is the most likely 
level of integration. In other words, key functions or key departments are likely 
to be integrated. If the organizational relatedness is identified as high, this opts 
for a deeper integration. Since the companies are related, it will probably be easy 
to implement a deeper integration. Then looking at the strategic needs, finding 
that there is a low need for organizational autonomy but a high need for strategic 
interdependence, this also indicates that the integration probably should be 
deeper. In other words, the companies are almost doing the same thing and there 
is no need to protect the acquired company boundary. At the same time, the stra-
tegic interdependence is high and if a deeper integration is implemented, more 
synergies might be realized. Since there is both a high need for strategic interde-
pendence and a high organizational relatedness, our model would suggest a full 
integration. 
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Figure 10 How to use the model (the authors) 
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6. Conclusion and suggestions for further research 
This part will try to provide an answer to the research question, as well as pre-
sent suggestions for further research within the field. 
6.1 Conclusion 
The research question of this thesis is: which variables affect the level of integra-
tion.  
 
Our findings, both theoretical and empirical, suggest that the variables that do 
affect the level of integration are the motives behind the acquisition, the organi-
zational relatedness and the need for strategic interdependence or organization-
al autonomy. 
 
Since all variables affected the level of integration, we saw a potential need to 
take them all into consideration simultaneously, and the framework was devel-
oped with the intention to display this mindset. The framework is not indented 
to be used as a tool for managers, but rather as a guideline for understanding the 
theoretical aspects of what affects the level of integration. 
 
Our empirical findings are based on a case where the integration processes were 
successful and correlated to the existing theories. Wherefore, we cannot con-
clude what will happen with the integration process, if managers do not comply 
with the theories. 
 
Finally, we would like to propose that this thesis is to be seen as a validation of 
the theories concerning the level of integration that is presented in the theoreti-
cal frame of reference. 
6.2 Suggestions for further research 
As a result of the empirical findings and the differences between the previous 
theories about the level of integration after an M&A, a new framework has been 
developed. This framework might be plausible on other cases, wherefore the 
authors of this thesis recommend others researchers to verify or improve the 
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developed framework, since the authors sees a potential in the convergence of 
the existing theories into one. 
 
Furthermore, we suggest that the link between the different parts of the model is 
further investigated, since we have seen tendencies that there might be such a 
linkage, for example, between a specific motive and a specific strategic need.  
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Appendix 1 – Interview Guide 
Interview with NN 
Can you describe how XX were before they got acquired? 
- How similar was Alpha and XX 
- What were the differences 
What motives can be identified behind the acquisition of XX? 
- Personal 
- Strategical 
- Economical 
Which were the personal? 
- Managerial challenge 
- Pride, status, larger company, mores sales 
Which were the strategical/economical? 
- Larger market share 
- New market 
- New product 
- Economies of scale and scope 
- Larger influence on the market 
- Acquire new technology 
- Financial gains 
- Better use of resources 
- Potential synergies 
What kind of acquisition was it? 
- Friendly/hostile, why 
- Financial aid, white knight 
- Consensus about buy/sell 
- Bidding war 
- Raid 
How were the bidding process conducted? 
 
In what extent should the companies be integrated? 
- Financial 
- Management 
- Operations 
How were the integration processes conducted? 
 
Did it became as planned? Why/why not? 
 
Has the strategy behind the acquisition affected the integration processes?  
- The level of integration 
- What parts that has been integrated  
- What economies of scale and scope that has been realized  
- The time the integration process took 
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Were there any resistance within the organizations about the changes, and how 
did you deal with them? 
 
How did XX perceive the acquisition and integration process? 
 
Which economical gains were to be expected? 
 
What costs occurred during the acquisitions? 
 
How was the costs distributed during the integration processes? 
 
How dependent were XX allowed to continue its business, how dependent is the 
companies today? 
 
Has differences between the organizations or strategies affected the integration, 
and in that case how? 
 
Were there any unexpected problems? How did you solve them? 
 
Has the requested level of integration been met? If yes, when did you considered 
it reached, and what processes were still ongoing? If no, does Alpha still work 
with the integration processes? Is it the same processes as before, or has the fo-
cus shifted? How will it be in the future? 
 
Which parts were integrated and why?  
 
What differences are to be found between the integration processes of Beta and 
Gamma? 
 
Have the acquisitions become profitable, why and in what way? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
